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Two dimensions of the Russo-Ukrainian war

stmm. 2026 (1): 221–230

DOI https://doi.org/10.15407/sociology2026.01.221

Full text: https://stmm.in.ua/archive/ukr/2026-1/19.pdf

RODION PRYSHVA, Master of Public Management and Administration, PhD Student at the Department of History and Theory of Sociology, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (12, Shovkovychna St., Kyiv, 01021)

pryshvarodion@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/0009-0001-1933-3329

The essay examines the nature of the Russo-Ukrainian War through the lens of two conceptual models: the trinitarian and the total war models. The analytical point of departure is the author’s cautionary note regarding the 'fog of war,' which disorganizes political thought and impels statesmen toward irrational decision-making. Consequently, only the rationalization of war aims can prevent strategic catastrophe.

The trinitarian model, formulated by Carl von Clausewitz in his treatise «On War», is presented as a system of equilibrium between the government, the military, and the people. The wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were characterized by limited objectives, professional standing armies, and the insulation of the civilian population from direct participation in hostilities. Governments sought to restrain their political ambitions, the military acted with caution due to the difficulties of replenishing losses and the constraints of the magazine system, and the populace provided the economic foundation of the state, precluding their active involvement in armed conflict. This order maintained organic social solidarity.

In contrast, the concept of total war, developed by Erich Ludendorff in his eponymous work, envisioned the subordination of politics to military exigencies and the full mobilization of society. Within this framework, the army, the state, and the people merge into a single militarized mechanism. The historical experience of the World Wars demonstrated that such a model unravels the social fabric, exhausts the economy, and leads to catastrophe.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict is characterized here as a hybrid: while declaratively framed as a total war due to the maximalist goals formulated by both sides, it is factually conducted according to the logic of trinitarian warfare. The absence of full economic and societal mobilization, selective conscription practices, and attempts to maintain a semblance of peacetime normalcy create a rift between the military and the civilian population. The author concludes that this very contradiction constitutes the core problem: it undermines social solidarity and necessitates a fundamental reappraisal of strategic approaches to modern warfare.

Keywords: war, Russo-Ukrainian War, total war, cabinet war, Clausewitz, Ludendorff, mobilization, policy of war aims, revolution, regular army, people's army, strategy

Referenes:

  1. Black, J. (1994). European Warfare, 1660-1815. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499429

  2. Defoe, D. (1697). An Essay upon Projects. London, UK: Three Legs.

  3. Delbrück, H. (1975). History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History. Vol. 4. The Modern Era. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1975.9945189

  4. Durkheim, E. (1984). The Division of Labor in Society. New York, NY: The Macmillan Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17729-5

  5. Fairburn, W.A. (1919). Frederick the Great. New York, NY: The Nation Press.

  6. Fischer, F. (1961). Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914/18. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.

  7. Liddell Hart, B. (1954). Strategy. New York: F.A. Praeger.

  8. Lodge, R. (1930). Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy 1740-1748. London, UK: John Murray.

  9. Ludendorf, E. (1936). The Nation at War. London, UK: Hutchinson & Co.

  10. Radkau, J. (1998). Das Zeitalter der Nervosität. Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und Hitler. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.

  11. Van Creveld, M. (1991). The Transformation of War. New York, NY: Free Press.

  12. Venohr, W. (1988). Der Soldatenkönig: Revolutionär auf dem Thron. Berlin: Ullstein.

  13. Von Clausewitz, K. (1873). On War. London, UK: N. Trübner and Co.

  14. Von Mises, L. (1951). Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

  15. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

  16. Winter, J., Robert, J.-L. (1999). Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919: Vol. 1. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Received 15.12.2025

Accepted for publication after review 07.01.2026

Two dimensions of the Russo-Ukrainian war

stmm. 2026 (1): 221–230

DOI https://doi.org/10.15407/sociology2026.01.221

Full text: https://stmm.in.ua/archive/ukr/2026-1/19.pdf

RODION PRYSHVA, Master of Public Management and Administration, PhD Student at the Department of History and Theory of Sociology, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (12, Shovkovychna St., Kyiv, 01021)

pryshvarodion@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/0009-0001-1933-3329

The essay examines the nature of the Russo-Ukrainian War through the lens of two conceptual models: the trinitarian and the total war models. The analytical point of departure is the author’s cautionary note regarding the 'fog of war,' which disorganizes political thought and impels statesmen toward irrational decision-making. Consequently, only the rationalization of war aims can prevent strategic catastrophe.

The trinitarian model, formulated by Carl von Clausewitz in his treatise «On War», is presented as a system of equilibrium between the government, the military, and the people. The wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were characterized by limited objectives, professional standing armies, and the insulation of the civilian population from direct participation in hostilities. Governments sought to restrain their political ambitions, the military acted with caution due to the difficulties of replenishing losses and the constraints of the magazine system, and the populace provided the economic foundation of the state, precluding their active involvement in armed conflict. This order maintained organic social solidarity.

In contrast, the concept of total war, developed by Erich Ludendorff in his eponymous work, envisioned the subordination of politics to military exigencies and the full mobilization of society. Within this framework, the army, the state, and the people merge into a single militarized mechanism. The historical experience of the World Wars demonstrated that such a model unravels the social fabric, exhausts the economy, and leads to catastrophe.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict is characterized here as a hybrid: while declaratively framed as a total war due to the maximalist goals formulated by both sides, it is factually conducted according to the logic of trinitarian warfare. The absence of full economic and societal mobilization, selective conscription practices, and attempts to maintain a semblance of peacetime normalcy create a rift between the military and the civilian population. The author concludes that this very contradiction constitutes the core problem: it undermines social solidarity and necessitates a fundamental reappraisal of strategic approaches to modern warfare.

Keywords: war, Russo-Ukrainian War, total war, cabinet war, Clausewitz, Ludendorff, mobilization, policy of war aims, revolution, regular army, people's army, strategy

Referenes:

  1. Black, J. (1994). European Warfare, 1660-1815. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499429

  2. Defoe, D. (1697). An Essay upon Projects. London, UK: Three Legs.

  3. Delbrück, H. (1975). History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History. Vol. 4. The Modern Era. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1975.9945189

  4. Durkheim, E. (1984). The Division of Labor in Society. New York, NY: The Macmillan Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17729-5

  5. Fairburn, W.A. (1919). Frederick the Great. New York, NY: The Nation Press.

  6. Fischer, F. (1961). Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914/18. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.

  7. Liddell Hart, B. (1954). Strategy. New York: F.A. Praeger.

  8. Lodge, R. (1930). Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy 1740-1748. London, UK: John Murray.

  9. Ludendorf, E. (1936). The Nation at War. London, UK: Hutchinson & Co.

  10. Radkau, J. (1998). Das Zeitalter der Nervosität. Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und Hitler. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.

  11. Van Creveld, M. (1991). The Transformation of War. New York, NY: Free Press.

  12. Venohr, W. (1988). Der Soldatenkönig: Revolutionär auf dem Thron. Berlin: Ullstein.

  13. Von Clausewitz, K. (1873). On War. London, UK: N. Trübner and Co.

  14. Von Mises, L. (1951). Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

  15. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

  16. Winter, J., Robert, J.-L. (1999). Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919: Vol. 1. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Received 15.12.2025

Accepted for publication after review 07.01.2026

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